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FOREWORD

ETHICS AND THE LINE-ITEM VETO
JOHN

H.

ROBINSON*

In the Foreword to the Inaugural Issue of the Notre
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy, Professor Douglas
Kmiec offered the. world a journal that would rigorously and
consistently examine legal propositions through an ethical
lens, thereby making practical application of the insights of
both philosophy and the Judeo-Christian tradition to timely
issues of public concern.' The articles included in the inaugural issue all, quite appropriately, focused on the relationship
between law and morality, some in general terms, others in
terms more closely tied to the role religion should play in determining public policy.
At first glance it might seem odd that this issue, the immediate sequel to the inaugural issue, should be devoted to
the line-item veto. Isn't the item veto, after all, a perennial
political football, sought by presidents and resisted by successive Congresses simply because the former want to increase
their power and the latter resist any diminution in theirs?
The short answer to that question is, "No." However tempting it is to reduce issues of this sort to matters of mere
power, the item veto raises questions that conscientious politicians must address before they can cast a responsible vote on
item veto proposals.
Foremost among the questions raised by the item veto is
this one: What sort of duty does an elected representative
have in a representative democracy, and how well do the current modes of forming majorities in our national legislature
square with those duties? For a government that grounds its
legitimacy in large part on the representativeness of its lawmakers, this question should be the first question that is
* Faculty Research Associate, Thos. J. White Center on Law and
Government. Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame.
Member of the Bar of Rhode Island. B.A., Boston College, 1967; M.A.,
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asked of any legislative practice, yet it is virtually never asked
at all. Might it not be argued, perhaps even asserted as selfevident, that representatives have at least a prima facie obligation to their constituents to make an independent, personal
judgment on each proposal that comes before the legislature?
Isn't this precisely what we would require of ourselves in a
direct democracy, faulting ourselves for unconsidered votes
where with diligence we could have explored for ourselves
the costs and benefits of a proposal?
If in the hypothesized direct democracy we had shortchanged ourselves and our fellow citizens every time we gave
approval to a proposal that we had not examined (in exchange, perhaps, for others' support for proposals of our own
creation that they, in turn, had not examined), what is there
about representative democracy that makes that process acceptable? The question is perhaps answerable, but it surely
deserves to be asked. It can be argued that law-making in a
society as vast and heterogeneous as ours has become so complex that any attempt to analogize what goes on in Congress
to how a direct democracy might work or fail to work is more
likely to mislead than it is to enlighten. The force of that argument is, of course, a function of the actual complexity of
the law-making process. If each legislator's attending to the
merits of each proposal put before the legislature is impossible, then it is also undesirable. If, on the other hand, an item
veto, in at least some of its forms, would encourage legislators to take responsibility for each item that their vote endorses, and if thereby their duty to their constituents would
be more fully discharged, then the item veto is deserving of
consideration in a journal devoted to law, ethics, and public
policy.
Another question raised by item veto proposals is this:
What obligation do officials have to the Constitution? More
precisely, what obligation do they have to the system of
checks and balances that the founders so artfully wove into
the horizontal separation of power among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the national government?
They all take an oath to support and defend the Constitution;2 we rarely note the surface oddity of making the Constitution and not the nation or the people the object of our officials' sworn fealty. It may be that Robert Bellah is correct in
seeing the Constitution as the equivalent of the Covenant in
2. See 5 U.S.C. §3331 and U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3; Cf. U.S. CONST.
art. II, §1, cl. 8 (presidential oath).
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the experience of the Mosaic Jews and in the practice of colonial protestantism. 3 In any event, all of our national officials
owe a duty to the Constitution that transcends both their loyalty to party and their desire to see any particular political
purpose achieved. When, therefore, it is alleged that something as important as the appropriations process is no longer
consistent with what the Constitutions requires, that allegation deserves attention, lest realpolitik displace the Constitution as the ultimate test of the legitimacy of a legislative practice. Such an allegation is, of course, central to the
Constitutional case for an item veto, just as the claim that the
item veto would radically alter the balance of powers is central to the Constitutional case against the item veto.
Whatever the merits of the cases pro and con, it is hard to
see how a responsible elected official could fail to look beyond issues of short-term self-interest to the abiding questions of constitutional structure that the item veto debate
raises.
On a somewhat less lofty plane, it is more than merely
arguable that the national legislative process itself is out of
control, that the colossal deficits of recent years suggest a serious failure of both intelligence and will on the part of those
whom we have elected to exercise both wisdom and courage,
and that this failure is a culpable one, victimizing this generation by the foolish or venal allocation of funds and the next
generation by the debt and decay that they will inherit.
It is, perhaps, this sense of a process run amok that gives
line-item proposals their current urgency as it is their perceived utility as budget-improving devices that will determine
their political fate. Here too an ethical concern surfaces for
the conscientious public official. At what point do legislators'
duties reach beyond the service of their immediate constituencies within the limits of business as usual and impose upon
them a duty to take responsibility for the process itself in
which business as usual is conducted? The strongest candidate
for that point would be the point at which business as usual
begins to disserve the nation at large, when the consequence
of each legislator's maximizing the return on his district's investment in him, or on hers in her, is some palpable loss to
all, both currently and prospectively. But the factual premise
of current line-item advocates is that we are at such a point in
our political history right now. Insofar as legislators share
3. R. BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION IN
TIME OF TRIAL 30-35 (1975).
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that premise, they are, it seems, duty-bound to take line-item
proposals seriously, even if their mastery of the process as it
is currently constituted lets them get for their respective districts their fair share, and more, of the federal pie.
The articles included in this issue address these questions
and others. What is more, they run the gamut of positions
that can be taken on the item veto. Aaron Wildavsky, for example, argues that an item veto would increase Congressional
budgetary irresponsibility while creating a drastic alteration
in the separation of powers that would ultimately weaken the
ability of the federal government to resist the manifold pressures to let federal spending outstrip revenues.4 As an alternative remedy to the deficit problem, Wildavsky proposes a
global spending limit. Once that limit is in place, he sees
some value in a presidential item veto. Peter Schultz, on the
other hand, believes that the deficit problem is not fundamentally an institutional phenomenon, amenable to correction via such institutional devices as the item veto. To his
mind, deficits are political phenomena, traceable to our dual
commitment to an expensive welfare program and an even
more expensive defense capability. Like Wildavsky, Schultz
sees in the item veto an invitation to greater congressional
irresponsibility, but unlike Wildavsky, Schultz puts no stock
in a global spending limit, preferring instead presidential resort to the impoundment power, the constitutionality of
which Schultz defends, as a means of limiting congressional
profligacy.5
Congressman Edwards opposes the item veto because it
will, in his judgment, effect a major shift in policy-making
power from the legislature to the president and because such
a shift, whatever efficiency it facilitated, would lead to such a
consolidation of power in the hands of one person as to
threaten the liberty of us all. 6 According to Congressman Edwards it is not simply because Congress is jealous of its power
that it resists the item veto, but because congressional retention of its legislative prerogatives is the constitutionally provided check on executive usurpation and the constitutionally
provided mechanism by which the people are assured that
4. Wildavsky, Item Veto Without a Global Spending Limit: Locking the
Treasury After the Dollars Have Fled, 1 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 165 (1985).
5. Schultz, An Item Veto: A Constitutional and Political Irelevancy, 1
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 177 (1985).
6. Edwards, The Case Against the Line-Item Veto, 1 NOTRE DAME J. L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 191 (1985).
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those over whom they have the most control, their representatives, have the crucial say in the setting of policy, especially
spending policy. Senator Dixon, in contrast, favors a qualified
item veto as one way of reducing the federal deficit and as
the best way of exposing logrolling and pork-barrelling to the
light of day. He also sees the item veto as the unique means
of restoring the presidential veto to its full vigor, so that the
president can once again play the role in the appropriations
process that the authors of the Constitution intended him to
play.7 The qualification that Senator Dixon builds into his
item veto proposal is a considerable one: it allows a bare majority of Congress to override a veto, not the two-thirds
supermajority required by Article I, Section 7 for the overriding of a plenary veto. He believes that this device will give
the President a chance to call the Congress's attention to provisions in omnibus spending bills that almost surely received
scant attention as the bill progressed through the two houses,
and that this would bring about a reduction in wasteful
spending without effecting a radical shift in the balance of
power between the legislative and executive branches of the
federal government.
With reference to the two student comments on the item
veto, Nancy Townsend views the item veto as neither implicit
in the Constitution as it now stands nor desirable.8 Instead,
she advocates a Single Subject Amendment on the grounds
that such an amendment would effect all the good that the
line-item veto would produce with none of its constitutional
costs. Walter Brown focuses on what can be learned about
how to formulate an item veto amendment from the interpretation that courts in the states that have item veto provisions have given to those variously-worded texts.9
In a journal committed to bringing the Judeo-Christian
tradition to bear on contemporary policy questions, it is appropriate to note the religious dimension of the line-item debate. In this case, as in the case of most political disputes, the
tradition will substantially "underdetermine" the outcome of
the dispute; that is, it will not dispositively point to a particular resolution as uniquely and exclusively consistent with or
7. Dixon, The Case for the Line-Item Veto, 1 NORE DAME J. L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 207 (1985).
8. Townsend, Single Subject Restrictions as an Alternative to the Line
Item Veto Authority, 1 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 227 (1985).
9. Brown, Where's the Pork: Restoring Balance with a Line Item Veto, 1
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 259 (1985).
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implied by the tradition. This is not a defect in the JudeoChristian tradition; it is, instead, characteristic of the relation
that ordinarily obtains between religious traditions and particular social or political rules. A tradition is, in fact, betrayed
when it is made to appear that it inflexibly requires just one
out of a range of defensible responses to a perceived problem. While the Judeo-Christian tradition cannot direct an answer to the line-item debate, it can direct us in our efforts to
set the context in which we resolve that issue for ourselves.
At the most general level, the tradition unequivocally asserts that the function of government is to establish justice
and that it is in the light of that overarching objective that
micro-decisions concerning the relation between parts of the
government are to be addressed. In the Biblical tradition justice is not the product of an idealized social contract that hypothetical rational bargainers would reach if they could be
stripped of their biases. It is, instead, the product of the performance of an actual covenant struck at Sinai between
Yahweh, The God of justice, and his chosen people. The
people perform according to the covenant when they do justice, and the measure of their justice is their treatment of the
weakest and most vulnerable people in their midst: the
widow, the orphan, the poor, and the alien. Especially in the
prophetic books, it is whole societies and not simply individuals who are judged according to this criterion of justice: that
society is a just society where the powerless are protected, not
exploited. 10
In modern times at least one Christian confession, Roman Catholocism, has attempted to apply this biblical standard, mediated by the teachings of Jesus and by centuries of
reflection upon that teaching, to current social, political, and
international structures. The inspiration for this process can
be found in a series of papal encyclicals and bishops' pastorals
dating from Rerum Novarum, written in 1891, and in the Second Vatican Council's Pastoral Constitution on the Church in
the Modern World (Gaudium et Spes). The fruits of this process, however, must of necessity be found in the way in which
conscientious Christians in positions of power and influence
employ that biblical vision as a criterion to test the acceptability of the structures in which we live and of proposed changes
in those structures. This testing process requires that the nec10. See National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Pastoral letter on
Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy, §§27-44 (First Draft
1984); reprinted in 14 ORIGINs 344 (1984).
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essarily general mandates of the tradition be made somewhat
more specific, even though the specificity achieved thereby
will be both more fallible and more provisional than is true
when the tradition is couched solely in generalities. As to an
issue as deeply embedded in a particular political context as
the item veto issue is, perhaps the most relevant specification
of the Judeo-Christian tradition is this: it is the well-being of
the powerless, not the aggrandizement of the powerful, that
ought to be determinative of disputes about the allocation of
political power in our system of government. Government
"for the people" is not a mere shibboleth. It is instead a norm
to be used in choosing between alternative ways of distributing political power.
On this analysis, the question for the religiously sensitive
legislator is, will the item veto make the government more
responsive to the people, especially to the least well off
among them, or will it remove it further from them? That
this question is extremely difficult to answer does not invalidate it, it simply warns us against accepting facile and selfserving answers to it. Over and over again, those who govern
must be reminded that the enormous power that they wield is
not an end in itself, is not theirs to use as they please, but is
entrusted to them to be used for the common good, especially for the good of those least able to help themselves. Perhaps only our common biblical heritage can insinuate into
the debate among the powerful over political power, this necessary reminder that it is the effect of their power-brokering
on the powerless that is the ultimate test of the acceptability
of the deals they strike and of the compromises they reach. If
the articles in this issue help to put the item veto debate in
that context, they will have served a useful purpose.

